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STATE OF UTAH,
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vs.
LANE C. STROMBERG,
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REPLY BRIEF

]
)
]

Case No. 880618 CA

]

REPLY BRIEF

COMES NOW the Defendant/Appellant by and through his
attorney of record, Daniel R. Knowlton, and hereby submits this
Reply Brief in response to the matters raised in the brief of
Relspondent.

This brief responds to only certain matters raised

by the State, which it is felt require a response.

Most matters

were adequately handled in the Appellants brief, and therefore
will not be commented on herein.
POINT I:

THAT EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH
WARRANT WAS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE

The finding that Defendant possessed just over one ounce of
marijuana within 1000 feet of a public school cannot be upheld as
it was based on evidence from an improperly issued search
warrant.

The "totality-of-the-circumstances" must be considered

to see whether an affidavit in support of a search warrant meets
the probable cause standard.

In St.at.e_x- A,£S.Ll#

76

2 P. 2d 1107

(Utah 1988), the Court of Appeals of Utah stated, at 1109:

"Factors to be considered include, among others, the
veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge of
confidential informants, and whether the judicial officer
issuing the warrant reached a practical, common sense
decision. State v.Jansen, 732 P. 2d 127 (Utah 1987). The
weight accorded these factors may vary according to the
circumstances. SJtate v.. BajJ^ey, 675 P. 2d 1203 (Utah 1984)."
In Ayala, id., at 1110, the drug buy occurred within seven
days of the affidavit, and in issuing the search warrant the
"magistrate had available the firsthand observations of the
affiant, an experience narcotics officer."

In the case at bar,

the Affidavit for Search Warrant (Appendix "A" to Brief of
Respondent, hereinafter referred to as "Affidavit") shows that
all the percipient testimony (other that the testimony that one
who occasionally smokes marijuana will retain possession of pipes
for up to several years, id.) is based entirely on secondhand
information from a Ms. Heber.
In State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, at 1366, (Utah 1987), the
Court of Appeals of Utah stated, at 1366:
"Although no longer a required test under the Gates
standard, the veracity or reliability of an informant is
still a relevant consideration when reviewing the totality
of the circumstances. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, 103 S.Ct. at
2328; see also State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah
1987). However, the average neighbor witness is not the
type of informant in need of independent proof of
reliability or veracity."
The credibility of the then fifteen-year-old Ms. Heber was
not checked although Chief Gardner was aware that she was seeing
a psychiatrist for stress as well as group therapy at school
(reporter's transcript of defendant's motion to suppress
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evidence, hereinafter referred to as Tr. Ms., pp. 54-5), and as
such was much less reliable than the average neighbor witness.
She had seen the defendant smoke marijuana, but she had never
seen him smoking marijuana in the house (Tr. Ms. p. 20), nor seen
drugs in the house (Tr. Ms. p. 25), and had seen marijuana pipes
in three locations one and one half years previous to the police
interview. (Tr. Ms. p. 27.)

It is questionable whether she could

distinguish a marijuana pipe from other pipes.
Furthermore, none of the percipient testimony of Ms. Heber
is couched in present-tense language (Affidavit), but is all
remarkably past tense.

The information was stale.

In United States v. Craig, 674 P Supp 561 (WD La, 1987), it
is stated that where the affidavit on which the search warrant is
based describes the offense as having occurred within a certain
time period but without specifying dates (for example, during
past six months) the court reviewing the question of staleness of
information must presume that the transactions took place in the
most remote part of the time span, otherwise any ancient evidence
could be used by merely describing it as falling within a period
of time ending with the current date.

Under this sensible

analysis, the testimony in the Affidavit at hand would be that
marijuana was smoked one and one half years ago, the pipes had
been seen one and one half years ago, and that one pipe had been
seen over two months before the Affidavit was signed (Affidavit).
This staleness must be considered with the other weaknesses in
evaluating the totality of the circumstances.

The State argues that this was a continuing endeavor, to
mitigate the obvious staleness.

First, they argue it was

"commenced on February 14, 1980" (Brief of Respondent, p. 11),
merely because of a marijuana possession conviction then.
Despite the obvious, that the facts justifying a conviction
may've occurred long before the date of conviction, the issuing
magistrate would have to conclude there was a six-year-plus gap
between this conviction and any evidence of marijuana involvement
(from February 14, 1980, to date of the Affidavit, May 20, 1988,
less the testified-to one and one half years prior to May 20,
1988.)

The magistrate could not reasonably have found a

continuous activity in the face of this minimum six and a half
year gap.

This itself is evidence of isolated occurrences.

Were

all this sufficient to justify a warrant, a man who'd smoked
marijuana six or seven years ago, if he were seen with what could
be an exotic tobacco pipe in the past year or two, would be
subject to search and siezure anytime, any place, since an expert
could opine, as did Officer Brian (see Affidavit), that he likely
retains the paraphernalia for up to several years.
The State's argument that staleness does not occur because
"the business of dealing in illegal drugs is ordinarily a
regenerating activity" (Brief of Respondent, p. 10), is
inappropriate.

The Affidavit states not a scintilla of evidence

that Defendant was engaged in drug sales, and the cases cited
under that argument are accordingly misplaced.

A few usages of

marijuana over one and one half years are not tantmount to the
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continuous activities of cultivating growing plants (Brief of
Respondent, p. 9)--plants do not grow only on isolated days-loansharking operations, nor drug-smuggling operations (id. at p.
10).
The State has made no serious attempt to rebut the facts
that the search was completely pretextual.

Nor can they, since

Mr, Andrus, Davis County Attorney's Office, testified that what
was really sought was not just the pipes (the only thing
testified to in the Affidavit to be at the house, per the
Affidavit), but controlled substances (see eg. Record, p. 85).
Mr. Andrus knew they did not have information that the defendant
was a drug dealer, but they hoped by this to be able to develop
some information later and get a second search warrant, which
they attempted to do.

(See eg. Tr. Ms. p. 187-8.)

The fact the

warrant is pretextual should overcome any grounds of "good
faith".
On this skimpy and dilatory basis, the warrant issued,
describing, in an omnibus way, not "marijuana" nor, most
accurately, "pipes", but "controlled substances", "records",
"accounts", etc. (see Search Warrant, attached to Brief of
Respondent) for the latter of which, paticularly, there was no
evidentiary basis whatsoever.

The only attack in the State's

brief on the fact the warrant was pretextual, was to state an
absence of legal authority in the Appellant's brief.

The area

where pretextual search is most noticeably encountered is in
pretextual traffic stops.

If an arrest for a traffic violation

is a mere pretext for an exploratory search, the search will not
be sustained.

United States v,Jones 452 F2d 884 (CA8 Mo).

McReynolds v. State 441 So2d 1016 (Ala App 1983) (traffic officer
with knowledge defendant's license had been suspended one year
earlier could not stop automobile and ask to see operator's
license as ruse in intended search for some possible crime).
People v. Wetherbe 122 111 App 3d 654 (1984), 78 111 Dec 285, 462
NE2d 1 (inventory of trunk of vehicle held to be a sham where
deputy had acted pursuant to investigatory motive).
Considered altogether, the totality of the circumstances
shows a warrant which should've been limited to pipes, if at all,
issued on grounds insufficient by reason of a six-year-plus gap,
unreliable, and stale.
POINT II:

THAT A CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANT FOR FELONY
POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA IS AN UNREASONABLE AND
UNCONSTITUTION DEFINITION OF A CRIME

Utah Code Ann. Section 58-37-8(5)(a)(i) through (iii)
provides enhancement to a felony if the specific act was
committed:
M

(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary
school or on the grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium,
or other structure or grounds which are, at the time of the
act, being used for an activity sponsored by or through a
school under Subsection (5)(a)(i);
(iii) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or
grounds included in Subsection (5)(a)(i) or (ii);"...
Lacking a nexus, or causal connection, between the act
occurring within that distance from a school activity or
property, and resulting detriment to those schoolchildren, the
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statute violates due process, denies equal protection to those
living within the prescribed distance, and constitutes an
impermissable irrebutable presumption.
With regard to due process, that the statutory enhancement
is arbitrary and capricious in this case is easily seen.

First,

possession, without any proof of any intent, or attempt, to sell
or distribute, or any actual relationship to the school, is
without effect on the school.

It is telling on this point that

the Federal cases cited by Respondent, upholding the distance
distinction from school grounds, State v. Jones, 77 9 F.2d 121
(2nd Cir. 1985, United Statesv. Nieves, 608 F.Supp 1147
(D.C.N.Y. 1985), United States v. Cunningham, 615 F.Supp 519
(D.C.N.Y. 1985), and United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215
(D.C. Cir. 1987), are cases involving dilaudid, heroin or cocaine
sale or distribution.

None stood on mere possession, much less

of marijuana.
These Federal cases are likewise illustrative of the danger
of such prosecutorial discretion.

The prosecutor, armed with the

enhancement statute, may easily treat mere possession nearly as
seriously as sale.

These Federal cases should have no binding

authority under the Utah Constitution Art. 1, Section 7, due
process provision, and it is submitted the application of this
enhancement statute to simple possession of marijuana, in a
private home, without evidence of intent to or attempt to sell,
and without proof of the possession proximately causing detriment
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to a local school, violates the Utah due process clause, as well
as the Federal.
Subsection (5)(a)(ii) of the statute applies enhancement to
acts (coupled with Subsection (5)(a)(iii)) within 1,000 feet of
any structure, facility, or grounds being used for an activity
sponsored by or through a school.

Undoubtedly, if a school

acquires a property and builds a school nearby a home where a
person has long before stored an ounce of marijuana under lock
and key, an enhancement will be said to occur under the statute.
Certainly then, every premises or building visited by every
capricious school-sponsored field trip becomes a transient
nucleus of a temporary zone 2,000 feet wide.

Perhaps, since

schoolbussing is a sponsored activity, every premises a schoolbus
stops at becomes a momentary nucleus of the prohibited zone.
Further, if it is recognized that homes are closer together, and
schools nearer, in racially- and poverty-mixed central cities,
the statutory enhancement is visited more harshly upon those
residents.
It can be seen from the fact of the enhancement that a
legislative presumption has been made that drug acts occurring
within 1,000 feet of a school are irrebuttably deemed to be more
culpable, as injurious to schoolchildren.
enhanced to a felony.

Hence any such act is

In .Cojiri.ty. C^urt^gf ^

AlJ.en,

60 L Ed 2d 777, 99 S Ct 2213 (1978) (citing as precedent ToJLjLi
United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1942),

Leary v. United States, 3 95

U.S. 6 (1968), the United States Supreme Court held that a
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criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as irrational or
arbitrary, and hence unconstitutional for purposes of due
process, unless it can at least be said with substantial
assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow
from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.

That case

involved the statutory presumtion that the presence of a firearm
in an automobile is generally presumptive evidence of its illegal
possession by all persons then occupying the vehicle.

The court

analyzed that the jury could reasonably conclude the guns found
across an open handbag of a sixteen-year-old girl were more than
likely in the possession of the other occupants of the vehicle,
too, three grown men.

Noteworthy is the fact the court analyzed

the presumption on the frame of the specific facts of that case,
not merely in the abstract.
Applying that same analysis to our statutory presumption, on
our specific facts, for the statute to be valid, it must be more
likely than not that one ounce of marijuana possessed in a
private dwelling, with no evidence of intent to sell or
distribute, nor attempt to sell or distribute, and no evidence
even of usage of the marijuana, is more likely than not to
detrimentally affect a school located within 1,000 feet.

On

these facts, it is illogical to assume anything or any person
affiliated with the school had the slightest impact with the
storage of the small amount, and hence the statute is arbitrary
and capricious if applied here.

At the least, the court should

conclude that for the enhancement to be upheld, a nexus must be
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proven, beyond simple possession, and that applied to simple
possession of marijuana in a private dwelling, without more, the
statute is capricious.
Coming back to the issue of prosecutorial discretion,
Appellant notes that Slate v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969),
22 Utah 2d 343, at 346, stands for the proposition that where
there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two punishments is
applicable to an offense an accused is entitled to the benefit of
the lesser.

This case was distinguished from SJtaLfe^^

753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988).

Considering the vast portion of cities

affected by the proximity to school activities (not just
property), the charging authorities of prosecutors under the
statute is too broad.
CONCLUSION
The matters asserted herein are in response to certain
matters raised in the brief of the State, and do not waive nor
diminish the points raised and argued in Appellant's brief. It is
respectfully submitted that the evidence obtained pursuant to the
search warrant was improperly admitted into evidence, upon the
basis that probable cause was lacking for the issuance of the
warrant, that the warrant was pretextual, over broad on its face,
and based on stale information.

Furthermore, it is submitted the

enhancement statute is an unconstitutional violation of
Appellant's due process rights.

Appellant requests that this

Court reverse his conviction and remand the matter for future
proceedings in accordance with the points and requests in
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Defendant/Appellant's brief, with the instruction that, absent a
further nexus between the school and the possession, a felony
conviction cannot be obtained.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of July, 1989

Daniel R. Knowlton
Attorney for
Defendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the ^ I
day of July, 1989, four
true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY teRIEF were
delivered to Paul Van Dam, Attorney General, 2^6/ State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah.
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APPENDIX A

MELVIN C. WILSON 3513
Davis County Attorney
Courthouse
Farmington, Utah 84025
Telephone: 451-3227
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLEARFIELD DEPARTMENT

THE STATE OF UTAH,
:
In Re: Search of the
premises described as
1487 South 1250 West,
Syracuse, Davis County, Utah,
a single-family dwelling.

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)

STATE OF UTAH

) ss:

;:

AFFIDAVIT FOR
SEARCH WARRANT

:

Before Alfred C. VanWagenen, Circuit Court Judge, the
undersigned, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he has
probable cause to believe that on the premises which are
described as:
1487 South 1250 West
Syracuse, Davis County, Utah,
A single-family dwelling
there is now certain property described as:
Controlled substances,
Drug paraphernalia,
Identification cards, records, accounts,
books, pictures, receipts, personal
property or other items evidencing
ownership, occupation or control of the
above premises or rooms therein.

•rne racts to establish the issuance of this warrant are
as follows:
1.

Affiant is a peace officer employed by Syracuse city

and is involved in the investigation of an illegal sexual act
alleged to have been committed by Lane Stromberg.
2.

On the 25th of April, 1988# a 15 year old girl stated

to affiant that she was acquainted with Lane Stromberg, an adult
male, and that she had had sexual intercourse with Stromberg at
his residence at 1487 South 1250 West in Syracuse, Utah, during
the first week of March, 1988.

The girl stated that this

occurred in an upstairs bedroom.
3.

The 15 year old girl stated that she has been to

Stromberg's home several times in the past year and a half, as
she is a close friend to Stromberg's own teen age daughter.
During that time, the 15 year old said she has seen Stromberg
smoking marijuana three or four times.

She has seen various

marijuana pipes lying around the house in various locations
including on the bookshelf of Stromberg's water bed in his
bedroom, in the kitchen area of the home, and in the room where
Stromberg keeps his personal computer, in the basement.

The last

time she saw a marijuana pipe at his residence was the first week
of March, 1988.
4.
information.

She has not been in the home since then.

Affiant believes the girl is giving reliable
Affiant has verified with a school counselor that

the girl and Stromberg's daughter are good friends and that the
girl has no juvenile court record.

Furthermore affiant has

checked Lane Stromberg's criminal record, which shows a
conviction for possession of marijuana dated February 14, 1980.

5.

Affiant has spoken to Lon Brian, an undercover

narcotics officer employed by the Davis Metro Narcotics Strike
Force.

Officer Brian has received training from the federal DEA

regarding drugs and undercover drug operations, has worked for
nearly three years as an undercover narcotics officer, and has
witnessed thousands of drug transactions involving the use,
possession, and sales of controlled substances.
6.
case.

Officer Brian is familiar with the facts of this

Based on his training and experience, a person who

occasionally smokes marijuana in his own home retains possession
of the pipes or other paraphernalia for long periods of time, up
to several years.
WHEREFORE, affiant prays that a search warrant be issued
for the search of the above-described premises and the seizure
of any of the said items.

Afffiar|t
Subscribed and sworn to me this ^O

day of May, 1988.

QzfJ c tfc id
C i r c u i t /(court Judge

**^\»

